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Originalist Law Reform,
Judicial Departmentalism,
and Justice Scalia
Kevin C. Walsht

INTRODUCTION

Judicial departmentalism is the view that the Constitution
means in the judicial department what the Supreme Court says
it means in deciding a case. It is a legally superior alternative to
judicial supremacy, which is the idea that the Constitution
means for everybody what the Supreme Court says it means in
deciding a case. 1
The perspective of judicial departmentalism provides a useful
way to think about originalist law reform. By insisting on the real
legal boundaries around the legal authoritativeness of Supreme
Court determinations, judicial departmentalism clears the way
to understanding how the constitutional law developed by the
Supreme Court can differ from what the law of the Constitution
really is at any particular time. Judicial departmentalism
provides a way of thinking about how the original law of the
Constitution is still the law unless lawfully changed even while
divergent constitutional law applied in the judicial department
is also the law.2

When the constitutional law applied in the judicial department diverges from the law of the Constitution, it displaces that
law in the judicial department. But the displacement is only
partial. The persistence of the law of the Constitution explains
how there remain legal standards that are legally valid independent of the judicial department's say-so but also fully inside
the law for their potential application. This persistence justifies
t Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. I thank my Richmond
colleagues Jud Campbell, Hank Chambers, Paul Crane, Jessica Erickson, Bill Fisher,
and Jack Preis for helping me think through the arguments and ideas in this Essay as
they gestated over time.
1 See generally Kevin C. Walsh, Judicial Departmentalism: An Introduction, 58
Wm & Mary L Rev 1713 (2017).
2
See id at 1733-34.
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the originalist law reform that happens, for example, when the
Supreme Court replaces nonoriginalist precedent with something more faithful to the law of the Constitution.3
Drawing on examples from Justice Antonin Scalia's jurisprudence, this Essay uses the perspective of judicial departmentalism to examine the nature and limits of two partially successful originalist law reforms in recent years. It then shifts to an
examination of how a faulty conception of judicial supremacy
drove a few nonoriginalist changes in the law that Scalia properly dissented from. Despite the mistaken judicial supremacy
motivating these decisions, a closer look reveals them to be
backhanded tributes to judicial departmentalism because of the
way that the Court had to change jurisdictional and remedial
doctrines to accomplish its substantive-law alterations. The
Essay closes with a discussion of the somewhat surprising potential that § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment offers for originalist law reform when situated within a framework of judicial departmentalism. Originalism provides both a foundation for
understanding the breadth of Congress's enforcement power under § 5 and also a means of grounding enforcement legislation
other than existing judicial doctrine. The combination of judicial
departmentalism and originalism can be particularly potent for
generating originalist law reform in areas in which existing
substantive Fourteenth
judicial doctrine underenforces
Amendment protections when measured against the original law
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I. ORIGINALIST LAW REFORM: RECENT EXAMPLES AND LIMITS
Justice Scalia participated judicially in partially successful
efforts for originalist law reform of Second and Sixth Amendment
doctrines. In District of Columbia v Heller,4 Scalia wrote an
originalist opinion for the Court that recognized and enforced,
against conflicting DC law, an individual right to keep and bear
a handgun for self-defense in one's home.5 And in Crawford v
Washington,6 Scalia wrote an originalist opinion for the Court

3
4
5
6

See id at 1730.
554 US 570 (2008).

Id at 636.
541 US 36 (2004).
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that ensured application of the Confrontation Clause7 to prevent
the introduction of out-of-court testimonial statements not subject to prior cross-examination that had come in under the Ohio
v Roberts8 approach overruled in Crawford.9
Both Heller and Crawford marked significant changes in
our constitutional law. Yet the practical impact of each has been
contained in ways that show the limits of originalist law reform
when viewed within the framework of judicial departmentalism.
The Supreme Court extended the reach of Heller in McDonald
v City of Chicagolo by incorporating the right it had recognized
against the states. This extension of reach did not involve any
extension of the recognized right itself, though. That recognized
right remains defined by the Supreme Court as "the right to
possess a handgun in the home for the purpose of self-defense."11
There has been extensive litigation over the further scope of the
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, such as its
protections outside the home and for other types of weapons. But
the Supreme Court has not-as of this time, anyway, seven
terms after McDonald-grantedreview of any of the resulting
lower-court decisions. And the cases decided in the lower courts
have largely decided against acknowledging any additional
scope to the Second Amendment protections provided by Heller.12
While there are no doubt many variables that have contributed to the relatively limited scope of the Second Amendment
right thus far recognized by the Supreme Court, judicial departmentalism suggests focus on both horizontal and vertical
constraints arising out of the Supreme Court's position within
the judicial department. The Supreme Court is a multimember
appellate court composed of justices appointed by different presidents at different times and with different backgrounds and

7 US Const Amend VI (enshrining the defendant's right "to be confronted with the
witnesses against him").
8
448 US 56 (1980).
9 Crawford, 541 US at 68-69.
10 561 US 742, 750 (2010).
11 Id at 791.
12 See, for example, Reply Brief for Petitioners, Peruta v California, Docket No 16894, *3-5 (US filed Mar 7, 2017) (contrasting a Seventh Circuit decision recognizing a
right to bear arms outside one's home with the decisions of three state courts of last resort and four federal circuit courts of appeals ruling the other way); Kolbe v Hogan, 849
F3d 114, 120-21 (4th Cir 2017) (en banc) (noting that, "[i]n the wake of Heller, four of
our sister courts of appeals have also rejected Second Amendment challenges to bans on
assault weapons and large-capacity magazines").
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outlooks. From the perspective of any "pure" theory of interpretation, the Supreme Court's output will always be "impure" in
some way because of the horizontal constraints imposed by this
particular setting for constitutional adjudication. The justices
have different views about theories of interpretation, the desirability of legal change, and the weight of any number of other different legal variables. Yet "new law" emerges only from majority
agreement on outcomes and reasoning.
From the vertical perspective, any "new law" handed down
by the Supreme Court has effect in other courts only to the extent that those other courts actually take it up. Judges on these
lower courts are bound by vertical stare decisis, but that obligation is just one of many variables contributing to lower-court
decisions.
An illustrative lower-court case is the Fourth Circuit's recent en banc decision upholding-against a Second/Fourteenth
Amendment challenge-a Maryland "assault weapons" ban that
prohibits even the at-home possession of certain semiautomatic
rifles commonly used for lawful purposes, such as hunting and
self-defense.a This ban would have been unlawful, at least as applied to at-home possession for self-defense, if the Fourth Circuit
had treated these rifles as similar to handguns for Second
Amendment purposes. But the en banc majority held that the
banned weapons were not subject to Second Amendment protection at all because they closely resembled weapons used by the
military.14 In the alternative, the en banc majority held that the
ban was subject to intermediate scrutiny, which it found the law
satisfied.15
Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III, a vocal lower-court critic of
Heller and McDonald,16 wrote a concurring opinion in Kolbe v
Hogan17 describing Heller as "a cautiously written opinion,

13

See Kolbe, 849 F3d at 137.

14

See id (quotation marks and citation omitted):

We conclude . . . that the banned assault weapons . . . are not protected by the
Second Amendment . ... [W]e are convinced that the banned assault weapons
...
are among those arms that are like M-16 rifles-weapons that are most
useful in military service-which the Heller Court singled out as being beyond
the Second Amendment's reach.
15

See id at 139.
See generally, for example, J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the
UnravelingRule of Law, 95 Va L Rev 253 (2009).
17
849 F3d 114 (4th Cir 2017) (en banc).
16
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which reserved specific subjects upon which legislatures could
still act."1 Wilkinson grounded this observation in what one
might call a quasirealist account of Supreme Court decisionmaking, speculating that "[h]ad Heller in fact failed to reserve
those subjects, or had it been written more ambitiously, it is not
clear that it could have garnered the critical five votes."19
In comparison with Heller, which has mostly been limited
by a combination of lower-court reticence and Supreme Court
inactivity, Crawford has been cabined by the Supreme Court itself. That is how Scalia saw it, at least, in the two post-Crawford
cases of Michigan v Bryant2o and Ohio v Clark.21
Bryant narrowed the scope of the Confrontation Clause by
expanding an important category of statements not subject to its
prohibition. Under Crawford, application of the Confrontation
Clause to prohibit the introduction of an out-of-court statement
not subject to prior cross-examination depends on whether that
statement is "testimonial."22 Subsequent to Crawford, the Court
adopted a "primary purpose" test to determine whether statements are testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation
Clause.23 In Bryant, the Supreme Court applied this primarypurpose test to deem nontestimonial a gunshot victim's statements about who shot him.24 In the circumstances of that case
(which are important to assessing whether the Court got it right,
but not essential to set forth here), a majority of the justices determined that the primary purpose of the victim's statements
was not to give testimony but instead "to enable police assis-

tance to meet an ongoing emergency."25
In dissent, Scalia charged the Bryant majority with adopting a "distorted view [of the 'ongoing emergency' category] that
creates an expansive exception to the Confrontation Clause for
violent crimes."26 He accused the Court majority of seeking to
sneak back in the "reliability" approach of the case law overruled

18
19
20
21
22

23
24

25
562 US
26

Id at 150 (Wilkinson concurring).
Id at 150-51 (Wilkinson concurring).

562 US 344 (2011).
135 S Ct 2173 (2015).
Crawford, 541 US at 51.
See Davis v Washington, 547 US 813, 822-24 (2006).
See Bryant, 562 US at 377-78.
Id, quoting Davis, 547 US at 822. For a full discussion of the facts, see Bryant,
at 370-78.
Bryant, 562 US at 388 (Scalia dissenting).
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in Crawford, an approach he described as "most incompatible
with the text and history of the Confrontation Clause."27

A second case in which Scalia made a similar charge is
Clark. This was a case involving statements by a three-year-old
child to preschool teachers about how he received certain injuries.28 Scalia agreed with the rest of the Court that the child's
statements were nontestimonial, a conclusion that he would
have rested on the child's age alone.29 He did not join the opinion
for the Court because it addressed other issues in ways that he
disagreed with. He wrote separately "to protest the Court's
shoveling of fresh dirt upon the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation so recently rescued from the grave in Crawford."30
Scalia detected "hostility to Crawford and its progeny" in the
opinion for the Court in Clark, as well as dangerous dicta suggesting that "the primary-purpose test is merely one of several
heretofore unmentioned conditions .

.

. that must be satisfied be-

fore the [Confrontation] Clause's protections apply."31 Pointing to
language about the burden of providing evidence about the
reach of the Confrontation Clause, Scalia wrote that "[a] suspicious mind (or even mind that is merely not naive) might regard
this distortion as the first step in an attempt to smuggle
longstanding hearsay exceptions back into the Confrontation
Clause-in other words, an attempt to return to [the approach
overruled in Crawford]."32
Later Supreme Court rulings and lower-court "underrulings" and precedential narrowings are not the only ways that
the application of the law set forth in a Supreme Court ruling
like Heller or Crawford might be limited within the judicial department. 33 Whether a prior Supreme Court ruling may be applied
Id at 391 (Scalia dissenting).
Clark, 135 S Ct at 2177-78.
29 Id at 2183-84 (Scalia concurring in the judgment).
30
Id at 2184 (Scalia concurring in the judgment).
31 Id (Scalia concurring in the judgment).
32
Clark, 135 S Ct at 2185 (Scalia concurring in the judgment).
33
The terminology of "underrulings" and "precedential narrowings" are taken from
Professors Michael Stokes Paulsen and Richard M. Re, respectively. See Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some Variations on the Themes of Robert M. Cover's Justice
Accused, 7 J L & Religion 33, 82-88 (1989) (explaining that a lower-court judge "underrules" a Supreme Court precedent when the judge repudiates its authority and disregards it when deciding cases because the lower-court judge views it as "lawless" or "clearly
outside the range of allowable judicial interpretation of the Constitution"); Richard M. Re,
Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 Georgetown L J 921, 923 (2016)
(describing "narrowing" as "interpreting [a precedent] not to apply, even though [the
27
28
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as law in a later judicial proceeding also can depend on what
kind of proceeding we are talking about. This may seem counterintuitive because a foundational premise of our legal system is
that "the source of a 'new rule' [of constitutional law] is the
Constitution itself, not any judicial power to create new rules of
law."34 It follows that "the underlying right necessarily pre-exists
[the Supreme Court's] articulation of the new rule."36 How, then,
can it be that a prior Supreme Court ruling might not count as
applicable law in a particular judicial proceeding?
The answer to this question can be found in the Supreme
Court's retroactivity doctrine. As the Court itself has recognized,
the label of "retroactivity" can be misleading because the issue
"is not the temporal scope of a newly announced right, but
whether a violation of the right that occurred prior to the announcement of the new rule will entitle [a person] to the relief
sought" for violation of that right.36 Looking at our law through
this lens of "redressability," it is immediately apparent that
there are some judicial proceedings in which no remedy may be
had for violation of some individuals' newly announced rights.
The most significant category of this sort consists of postconviction proceedings seeking relief for violation of a right that was
newly announced only after the right holder's conviction obtained in violation of that right had become final.
Two cases involving the application of Crawford after final
convictions are illustrative here. Marvin Bockting and Stephen
Danforth were each convicted and sentenced in pre-Crawford
trials that included testimony admitted in violation of Crawford
(at least arguably) but in line with the doctrine that governed
before Crawford (or at least each was finally found to have lost
under the pre-Crawford doctrine).37 Each sought to take advantage of Crawford in a postconviction proceeding. The Supreme
Court held different remedial rules potentially applicable to
each.
Bockting sought to advance his Crawford-based argument in
federal habeas proceedings.38 The Supreme Court held, however,
judge thinks] that the precedent is best read to apply," a technique that is conceptually
distinct from both "overruling" and "distinguishing").
34 Danforth u Minnesota, 552 US 264, 271 (2008).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37
See Whorton v Bockting, 549 US 406, 410-15 (2007); Danforth, 552 US at 267-68.
38 See Whorton, 549 US at 413.
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that Crawford was a "new rule" of constitutional criminal procedure that was not retroactively applicable on collateral review in
federal habeas proceedings.39
Danforth, by contrast, sought to advance his Crawford-based
argument in state postconviction proceedings.40 The Supreme
Court held that the state courts were free, if they wished, to adopt
a different approach to "retroactivity" and provide a remedy in
state court that-because of Whorton v Bockting41-would have
been unavailable in federal court. 42 As it turns out, the state
court on remand decided as a matter of state law to stick with
the same approach to retroactivity that the Supreme Court used
as a matter of federal law.43 But as a matter of legal principle,
the availability of a remedy was governed by a remedy-specific legal rule, not by an inquiry into the temporal scope of Crawford.
The Danforth v Minnesota4< Court devoted a significant portion of its analysis to explaining that its own doctrinal framework for assessing the application of new rules in federal postconviction proceedings-a framework set forth in Teague v
Lane45-was based on an interpretation of the federal habeas
statute.4 6 In Justice John Paul Stevens's words, writing for the
Court, "A close reading of the Teague opinion makes clear that
the rule it established was tailored to the unique context of federal habeas and therefore had no bearing on whether States
could provide broader relief in their own postconviction proceedings than required by that opinion."47 Under Teague, the general
rule is that new rules of constitutional law announced after a
person's conviction has become final are not retroactive in federal habeas proceedings.48 That is, federal habeas proceedings
generally cannot be used to remedy the violations of new rules of
constitutional law for those whose convictions became final before the new rule was announced by the Supreme Court.
There are two exceptions to Teague's general rule, one for
new substantive rules and the other for "watershed" procedural
Id at 421.
Danforth, 552 US at 267-68.
41
549 US 406 (2007).
42 Id at 290-91.
43 Danforth v State, 761 NW2d 493, 498-99 (Minn 2009).
44 552 US 264 (2008).
45 489 US 288 (1989).
46 Danforth, 552 US at 274-82.
47 Id at 277.
48 See id at 274-75.
39

40

2017]

OriginalistLaw Reform

2319

rules.49 Neither of those exceptions was at issue in Danforth, and
the Court observed that
not a word in Justice O'Connor's [controlling opinion in
Teague] ...

asserts or even intimates that her definition of

the class eligible for relief under a new rule should inhibit
the authority of any state agency or state court to extend the
benefit of a new rule to a broader class than she defined.60
Teague does not bind state courts because it "is based on
statutory authority that extends only to federal courts applying
a federal statute."51 This not only is evident from a close reading
of Teague, but also is confirmed by the practice of state courts
following Teague that "almost universally understood the
Teague rule as binding only federal habeas courts, not state
courts."52
Under Danforth, the law to be applied to petitioners whose
convictions became final before Crawford has the potential to be
different in state and federal proceedings. And under the Supreme
Court's retroactivity jurisprudence more generally, the law to be
applied in postconviction proceedings is often different from the
law applied in proceedings prior to a final conviction. Consider, for instance, a federal tribunal ruling on a postCrawford Confrontation Clause objection (1) during a criminal
defendant's trial in the morning and (2) during federal habeas
proceedings for an individual whose conviction became final before Crawford in the afternoon. The same tribunal the same day
would apply Crawford in one (the trial), but not in the other (the
habeas proceedings).
Judicial departmentalism provides a more sophisticated
framework than judicial supremacy for understanding and analyzing the effects of legal changes like Crawford. To say that the
law is for everybody what the Supreme Court says it is in resolving a case-as judicial supremacy provides-is only to restate
the problem that results when (1) the Supreme Court changes
what it says the law is (2) after one's case has finished working
its way through the judicial system.
49 Id. This capsule description is somewhat simplified with respect to both exceptions. Because this Essay provides just a sketch of the Teague framework, those interested in the scope of these exceptions should look elsewhere.
50 Danforth, 552 US at 277-78.
51
Id at 278-79.
52 Id at 281.
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For someone imprisoned pursuant to a final criminal conviction, the issue presented by a new rule is not so much what the
law has become, but whether there is any judicial forum for a
new proceeding in which the new law may or must be applied
with respect to that person's old conviction and punishment so
that there may be a judicial remedy. These matters cannot be
settled by appeal to the imprecise assertion that the law is
whatever the Supreme Court has "said so." That is because at
least some Supreme Court precedents (such as Crawford and
other cases announcing certain kinds of new rules) are not required by the Constitution or any other federal law (at least at
this time) to be treated as binding law even within the judicial
department for most postconviction proceedings. Judicial departmentalism, by contrast, treats the binding law that results from
judicial determinations (including those of the Supreme Court)
as a function of the law of judgments, the law of precedent, and
the law of remedies.63 In so doing, judicial departmentalism
points the way to the right kinds of more specific doctrines that
exist precisely to answer questions like those raised by new
rules of constitutional law.
II. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENTALISM IN DISSENT
I have contended previously that justices should be judicial
departmentalists because "[j]ustices who know that their only
tools for securing legal settlement through adjudication are
judgments, remedies, and precedents are likely to judge in ways
that lead to better judgments, better remedies, and better precedents."64 The trio of decisions discussed in this Part-and Justice
Scalia's dissents in these cases-all support this contention.
These are examples of cases in which a Court majority's implicit
adoption of judicial supremacy led to legally defective analysis
about jurisdiction and remedies. Because judicial supremacy is
not the law, but a majority of justices operated in these cases as
if it were, the Court found itself needing to make changes in jurisdictional and remedial doctrines to grant itself the judicial
authority it needed to maintain its conception of supremacy as a
practical matter.

53
54

See Walsh, 58 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1715 (cited in note 1).
Id at 1740.
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The first example is Montgomery v Louisiana.55 This case
addressed a question reserved in Danforth. While Danforth authorized state courts to give greater "retroactive" effect to a new
rule than a federal postconviction court would, the question in
Montgomery was whether a state postconviction court could give
lesser "retroactive" effect to a certain kind of new rule.56 The

Court held that "when a new substantive rule of constitutional
law controls the outcome of a case, the Constitution requires
state collateral review courts to give retroactive effect to that
rule."65 The category of "substantive rules" for this purpose consists of those that fit within the first of two exceptions to
Teague's general rule of "nonretroactivity," embodied in the federal habeas statute, for federal habeas proceedings.58
The "new rule" at issue in Montgomery had been articulated
a few years earlier in Miller v Alabama.59 In Miller, a five-justice
majority of the Court decided that the Eighth Amendment forbids imposition of a life sentence without parole on those who
commit crimes as juveniles, unless sentencing includes an individualized determination of "irreparable corruption" or "incorrigibility" as of the time of sentencing.o When Henry Montgomery
had been sentenced to life without parole over forty years before
Miller, there had been no individualized determination about incorrigibility. Given the state of the law then, it would not have
occurred to anybody that such a procedure was constitutionally
required. Yet the Supreme Court held in Montgomery that
"[w]here state collateral review proceedings permit prisoners to
challenge the lawfulness of their confinement, States cannot refuse to give retroactive effect to a substantive constitutional
right that determines the outcome of that challenge."61
The novelty and potentially broad implications of
Montgomery's "retroactivity" holding-which imposes a new remedial obligation on state courts that authorize collateral attacks based on federal law-can be seen in the use to which the
principal premise underlying the Montgomery majority's holding
has been put by scholars seeking to extend the Court's faulty
136 S Ct 718 (2016).
Id at 728-29.
57 Id at 729.
58 Id at 728-29.
59 567 US 460 (2012).
60 Id at 472-73, 479-80.
61
Montgomery, 136 S Ct at 731-32.
55
56
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reasoning. In a recent article published in the Virginia Law
Review, Professors Carlos Vzquez and Stephen Vladeck argue
that Montgomery establishes-in the words of their title-"The
Constitutional Right to Collateral Post-conviction Review."62
These scholars describe the Montgomery "retroactivity" analysis
as "novel and momentous" for treating the "retroactive" application of a particular rule as constitutionally required in certain
postconviction settings.63 Their argument about the implications
of the constitutional "right" to collateral postconviction review
has many steps, leading to multiple conclusions at odds with
previously articulated jurisdictional and remedial doctrines. In
their own words, their conclusion-which goes beyond the "surface" holding of Montgomery to unfold the logic of its constitutionalization of the "retroactivity" issue-"call[s] into question
decades of conventional scholarly and judicial wisdom."64
Spelling out and enforcing the logic of Montgomery, they assert,
"should open the door to the revisiting of any number of other
assumptions about the contemporary structure of postconviction remedies."65 Vzquez and Viadeck do not purport to
revisit all of those, but instead set themselves the goal
to explain how and why, in a seemingly innocuous holding . .
Montgomery upends a half-century's worth of doctrinal and
theoretical analyses of collateral post-conviction review, a result that could have a significant impact on both commentators' and courts' understanding of the relationship between
collateral post-conviction remedies and the Constitution.66

All of this potential legal change-which is what it would
really be, not just a change in "conventional wisdom" or in commentators' and courts' "understanding"-would follow only, of
course, if later courts treat Montgomery's reasoning as generative. And there is ample reason in the law not to, including all
the disruption that it would cause to the prior law. Vdzquez and
Vladeck speculate, after all, that the Court in Montgomery "may
not have fully appreciated ... just how far-reaching the consequences" of its constitutionalization of its prior federal habeas
62 Carlos M. VAzquez and Stephen I. Viadeck, The ConstitutionalRight to CollateralPost-conviction Review, 103 Va L Rev 905 (2017).
63 Id at 910.
64

Id at 915.

65

Id at 915-16.
Vzquez and Viadeck, 103 Va L Rev at 916 (cited in note 62).

66
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retroactivity framework could be.67 They may be right about this,
but it is not as if the Court lacked notice about the substantiality of its inventive break with prior doctrine. Both Scalia's and
Justice Clarence Thomas's dissents unpacked the Montgomery
Court's errors in detail.
As Scalia explained-consistent with Danforth's understanding of Teague as grounded in interpretation of the federal
habeas statute-"[n]either Teague nor its exceptions are constitutionally compelled."68 Under the Court's approach coming into
Montgomery, "[a] state court need only apply the law as it existed at the time a defendant's conviction and sentence became
final. . . . Any relief a prisoner might receive in a state court af-

ter finality is a matter of grace, not constitutional prescription."69 Scalia argued that the Supreme Court has repeatedly said
that "federal habeas courts are to review state-court decisions
against the law and factual record that existed at the time the decisions were made."70 This focus is a function of the "backward-

looking language" of the federal habeas statute.71 "How can it
possibly, be, then," Scalia asked, "that the Constitution requires
a state court's review of its own convictions to be governed by
'new rules' rather than (what suffices when federal courts review state courts) 'old rules'?"72 Until the Court's decision in

Montgomery, Scalia argued, "it was Congress's prerogative to do
away with Teague's exceptions altogether."73 Scalia would have resolved Montgomery in line with the maxim that "[t]he Supremacy
Clause does not impose upon state courts a constitutional obligation it fails to impose upon federal courts."74
In any event, it is not very helpful to speculate in the abstract how any given court might distinguish Montgomery in a
different setting so that it does not unsettle so much that was

67 Id at 926. VAzquez and Vladeck use "necessarily" to describe the "far-reaching
consequences" they see as flowing from Montgomery. I disagree that these consequences
are necessary in any strict sense, and I believe courts should try to limit the damage
done by Montgomery to previously settled doctrine.
68 Montgomery, 136 S Ct at 739 (Scalia dissenting).
69 Id (Scalia dissenting).
70 Id (Scalia dissenting).
71 Id (Scalia dissenting) (discussing 28 USC § 2254(d), which "refers, in
the past
tense, to a state-court adjudication that 'resulted in' a decision that was contrary to, or
'involved' an unreasonable application of, established law").
72 Montgomery, 136 S Ct at 739 (Scalia dissenting).
73
Id at 741 (Scalia dissenting).
74 Id (Scalia dissenting).
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previously settled. It is sufficient here to note that in any circumstance in which application of Montgomery would threaten
some previously settled rule, there will be at least two options to
choose from-namely, the contemplated extension of Montgomery
and the previously settled rule. And the coherence of that previously settled rule with other previously settled rules, in contrast
with what applying some extension of Montgomery would call into
question, will likely provide good reason not to apply Montgomery
outside of its particular setting.
Regardless of how precisely it turns out that courts deal
with Montgomery in the future, the decision provides a case
study in how a mistaken notion of judicial supremacy can drive
doctrinal innovation in the area of jurisdiction or remedies. Absent some means of bringing Miller matters back within the judicial department through postconviction proceedings in which
Miller would govern, there was no way to ensure implementation of Miller for the large group of its intended beneficiaries
whose convictions had become final. If the Supreme Court in
Montgomery had simply treated the state court's application of
its own "retroactivity" law as the state-law remedial issue that it
was, the Court would have lacked jurisdiction to review it, much
less to insist on Miller's application. Apparently that is not an
outcome a majority of the Court was willing to countenance.
A similar dynamic was at work in another judicial-domainexpanding decision that Scalia also dissented from, Boumediene
v Bush.75 The Supreme Court held unconstitutional a federal
statute, the Detainee Treatment Act,76 that provided access to
Combatant Status Review Tribunals and appellate review in the
DC Circuit for noncitizens held outside the territorial United
States and designated by the military as enemy combatants.77 In
an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that
these arrangements violated the Suspension Clause78 because
Congress had eliminated access to the writ of habeas corpus for

553 US 723 (2008).
Pub L No 109-148, 119 Stat 2742 (2005).
77 Detainee Treatment Act § 1005, 119 Stat at 2740-44.
78 US Const Art I, § 9, cl 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it.").
75
76
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these individuals and had failed to provide an adequate
substitute.79
Scalia identified "an inflated notion of judicial supremacy"
as the driver of the decision in Boumediene.80 This notion of judicial supremacy displaced the Suspension Clause itself and the
principles of the Court's precedents interpreting it, he charged.81
And he spelled out his explanation of how the Court instead
should have understood its judicial role in terms that sound in
judicial departmentalism.
The Boumediene majority's basic mistake, Scalia asserted,
was to override the incidental nature of constitutional adjudication. The foundation of judicial power for federal courts to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional "is the power and duty of
those courts to decide cases and controversies properly before
them."82 It follows that the exercise of this power "is circumscribed by the limits of our statutorily and constitutionally conferred jurisdiction."83 That was the real issue: Does the Court
have jurisdiction? Yet the majority approached this backwards,
reasoning that it had to have jurisdiction because otherwise the
executive could evade review by the judiciary.84 "It is both irrational and arrogant," wrote Scalia, "to say that the answer must
be yes, because otherwise we would not be supreme."85
Chief Justice John Roberts wrote his own dissent in
Boumediene, in addition to joining Scalia's. He identified an additional way in which the Court had hurtled ahead when it
should not have: by ignoring traditional principles of exhaustion
that would have required the detainees to use the process provided by Congress in the Detainee Treatment Act.86 This charge
differs from Scalia's focus in that it is more about failing to use
an existing rule than about making up a new one, but the result

79 Boumediene, 553 US at 732-33. The majority's analysis presupposed that noncitizens held as enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay previously had been provided access to the writ of habeas corpus. That presupposition is mistaken for reasons outlined in
Scalia's dissent in Rasul v Bush, 542 US 466, 488-506 (2004) (Scalia dissenting).
s0 Boumediene, 553 US at 842 (Scalia dissenting).
81 Id (Scalia dissenting).
82 Id (Scalia dissenting).
83 Id (Scalia dissenting).
84 See Boumediene, 553 US at 743 (asserting that "a regime in which Congress and
the President, not this Court, say 'what the law is,"' would be "a striking anomaly in our
tripartite system of government").
85 Id at 843 (Scalia dissenting).
86 See id at 803-04 (Roberts dissenting).
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and underlying impulse are the same. The common thread is
that the Supreme Court strayed from its proper judicial role in
order to exercise control over an area outside its constitutional
domain.
A third example of jurisdictional invention in service of a
substantive agenda is United States v Windsor.87 The case started
out as an actual controversy between Edith Windsor and the
United States government. She sought a tax refund reflecting a
spousal exemption from the estate tax. That exemption had been
denied her because her deceased spouse was of the same sex and
§ 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act88 (DOMA) required the
federal government to treat as valid for federal-law purposes
only marriages between one man and one woman.89
Windsor won in the trial court.9 0 The federal government
agreed that she should have won but appealed anyway. 91 This
agreement created a problem for appellate jurisdiction because
there was no adverseness between the parties with respect to
the judgment that had been entered. The United States asked
the appellate court to affirm the trial-court judgment ordering
the government to pay Windsor her tax refund with credit for
the spousal exemption from estate tax that had been denied to
her because of DOMA § 3.92 At the same, the federal government
also refused to pay pending appellate review by the Second Circuit
and the Supreme Court.93 In effect, the government sought the
same order as below, but just from a higher-level court. The
Second Circuit accepted jurisdiction and affirmed the districtcourt judgment.94 The federal government sought certiorari,
again seeking affirmance.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, determined it possessed jurisdiction, and gave the Government the affirmance it
sought.95 In his opinion for the Court, Kennedy held that the
government's refusal to pay the refund despite agreeing with the
judgment requiring it to do so was "a stake sufficient to support

87

133 S Ct 2675 (2013).

Pub L No 104-199, 110 Stat 2419 (1996).
89 Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2682-83.
90 Windsor v United States, 699 F3d 169, 176 (2d Cir 2012).
88

91

Id.

92

Id.

93

Id.

94

Windsor, 699 F3d at 176.

95

Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2696.
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Article III jurisdiction on appeal and in proceedings before [the
Supreme] Court."96 According to Kennedy, 'Windsor's ongoing
claim for funds that the United States refuses to pay .

.

. estab-

lishes a controversy sufficient for Article III jurisdiction."97
Scalia dissented. With respect to the jurisdictional holding,
he was joined in dissent by Roberts and Thomas.98 In a tour de
force that opens with words echoing his famous solo dissent in
Morrison v Olson,99 Scalia described Windsor as a case about
"power": "This case is about power .

.

.. It is about the power of

our people to govern themselves, and the power of this Court to
pronounce the law."100 Scalia argued that the judiciary was being
used by the executive and that the Court's enabling of jurisdiction facilitated "Executive contrivance."1
The core of Scalia's dissent was his insistence on the judiciary's law-declaration function as incidental to its disputeresolution function. Answering the majority's invocation of the
statement in Marbury v Madisonl02 that "[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is," Scalia pointed out that "[t]he very next sentence of Chief
Justice Marshall's opinion makes the crucial qualification that
today's majority ignores: 'Those who apply the rule to particular
cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule."os Instead of respecting the proper role of the judicial department,
Scalia charged, the majority operated from an inflated notion of
judicial supremacy: "There is, in the words of Marbury, no 'necessity [to] expound and interpret' the law in this case; just a desire to place this Court at the center of the Nation's life."104 The

96

Id at 2686.

97

Id.

Justice Samuel Alito dissented from the Court's merits holding but believed that
there was Article III jurisdiction pursuant to a different theory than the one adopted by
the Windsor majority. See id at 2711-13 (Alito dissenting).
99 487 US 654, 699 (1988) (Scalia dissenting).
100 Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2697 (Scalia dissenting). Compare id (Scalia dissenting),
with Morrison, 487 US at 699 (Scalia dissenting) ("That is what this suit is about. Power.
The allocation of power among Congress, the President, and the courts in such fashion as
to preserve the equilibrium the Constitution sought to establish-so that 'a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department' can effectively be resisted.")
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
101 Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2702 (Scalia dissenting).
102 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
103 Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2703 (Scalia dissenting), quoting Marbury, 5 US (1 Cranch)
at 177.
104 Id (Scalia dissenting), quoting Marbury, 5 US (1 Cranch) at 177.
98
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Court's determination that it possessed jurisdiction made Windsor
the first of its kind. "In the more than two centuries that this
Court has existed as an institution," Scalia asserted, "we have
never [before] suggested that we have the power to decide a
question when every party agrees with both its nominal opponent and the court below on that question's answer."105
Although the jurisdictional ruling in Windsor was incorrect,
and was underpinned by an incorrect acceptance of a form of judicial supremacy, the Court's need to bend the jurisdictional law
was a backhanded tribute to judicial departmentalism. The
whole point of taking jurisdiction was to establish a precedent
that would be binding throughout the nation (unlike the Second
Circuit's decision, which would only have been binding within
the Second Circuit). The only way to accomplish that would be to
make use of the law of precedent, by arriving at a ruling of the
Supreme Court of the United States that would, by virtue of
that law, become binding on all judicial tribunals in the United
States.
The Windsor decision also enabled the Supreme Court to cover its tracks a bit when it created a constitutional right to samesex marriage exactly two years later in Obergefell v Hodges.106
Sensing which way the wind was blowing in Windsor's wake, the
majority of lower courts that addressed themselves to the existence of a constitutional right to same-sex marriage after Windsor
ruled in favor of such a right.107 As a consequence, the Supreme
Court in Obergefell could make it appear as if it were merely being reactive and recognizing a right that preexisted its exercise
of judicial will.
Unlike in Windsor, there was no need in Obergefell to warp
jurisdictional doctrine directly. The Supreme Court had already
stuffed so much into substantive constitutional law that James
Obergefell's claim was able to "aris[e] under"os the Constitution.
This time it was Roberts who explicitly accused the majority justices of entertaining an "extravagant conception of judicial supremacy."109 He asserted that "[t]hose who founded our country
105 Id at 2700 (Scalia dissenting). Scalia further noted that "[t]he United States reluctantly conceded that at oral argument." Id (Scalia dissenting).
106 135 S Ct 2584 (2015).
107 Id at 2597 (discussing the lopsided nature of the split in lower federal courts and
state high courts over a constitutional right to same-sex marriage).
108 US Const Art III, § 2.
109 Obergefell, 135 S Ct at 2624 (Roberts dissenting).
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would not recognize the majority's conception of the judicial
role."no

Montgomery, Boumediene, and Windsor are all cases in
which the Court's changes to the substance of the law were so
significant that the prior rules of remedies or jurisdiction needed
to be changed in order to facilitate the kind of substantive shift
that the majority justices had in mind. And each case involved a
majority motivated by a particular form of judicial supremacy.
Yet judicial departmentalism comes through even in these cases
because the Court needed to change the boundaries of the judicial department in order to bring matters within its perceived
monopoly over authoritative determinations of constitutional
meaning.
III. SECTION 5, JUDICIAL DEPARTMENTALISM, AND
LAW REFORM

ORIGINALIST

What might happen if the Supreme Court were to more explicitly and consistently acknowledge that it lacks a complete
monopoly on the authoritative meaning of the Constitution? By
confining the legal authoritativeness of judicial determinations
about the content of constitutional law to within the judicial department, judicial departmentalism invites attention to the possibility that judicial rulings may overenforce or underenforce the
law of the Constitution in a variety of ways. This possibility, in
turn, leads to consideration of the ways in which judicially underenforced rights might receive greater protection through legislative rather than judicial action by means of enforcement legislation premised on the content of the right itself rather than on
the judicially articulated underenforcing doctrine.
For a constitutional originalist, the original law of the
Constitution-except to the extent that it has been lawfully
changed-provides the standard against which to measure judicial doctrine to see if it underenforces, overenforces, or gets the
law of the Constitution right. Assuming that at least some
mismatch calls for originalist law reform, how should that be
accomplished?

110 Id (Roberts dissenting).
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Perhaps our constitutional law would be improved if the burden of originalist law reform did not fall entirely on the Supreme
Court. This final Part of this Essay on originalist law reform, judicial departmentalism, and Justice Scalia draws on an area of
law that he openly struggled with how best to implement judicially: § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. I offer a suggestion
that would probably have come as something of a surprise to
Scalia: the Court should invite Congress to use its enforcement
authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to act as a
partner in the enterprise of originalist law reform.
It is perhaps an understatement to observe that Scalia
would be cautious in considering this suggestion. The Supreme
Court's modern doctrine on the scope of Congress's § 5 power
was developed in a case that knocked down Congress's attempt
to provide greater protection under the First Amendment's Free
Exercise Clause than the Court had found it to provide in an
opinion by Scalia. That § 5 case was City of Boerne v Flores,111 in
which the Supreme Court held that the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993112-enacted in response to Employment
Division v Smith3-exceeded Congress's authority under § 5.114
According to Boerne, § 5 enforcement legislation must exhibit
"proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and
the legitimate end to be achieved."11
Scalia joined the Court's decision in Boerne but later rejected it in favor of a seemingly stricter approach. That move
came in Tennessee v Lane,116 in which the Court held that Title
II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990117 was within
Congress's § 5 authority "as it applies to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts."118 In dissent, Scalia argued that "[t]he 'congruence and proportionality'
standard, like all such flabby tests, is a standing invitation to
judicial arbitrariness and policy-driven decisionmaking. Worse
still, it casts this Court in the role of Congress's taskmaster.""

111 521 US 507 (1997) (Scalia).
112 Pub L No 103-141, 107 Stat 1488, codified as amended at 42 USC § 2000bb et seq.
113 484 US 872 (1990).
114 Boerne, 521 US at 536.
115 Id at 533.
116 541 US 509 (2004).
117 Pub L No 101-336, 104 Stat 327, codified at 42 USC § 12101 et seq.
118 Id at 533-34.
119 Id at 557-58 (Scalia dissenting).
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Prior to Lane, Scalia had agreed with a series of post-Boerne
decisions that found various provisions outside of Congress's authority under § 5. But he had joined in dissent from a decision
that upheld a statutory entitlement to twelve work weeks of unpaid leave as a congruent and proportional responses to unconstitutional sex discrimination.120 The dissent he joined in that
case, Scalia said, established that "Congress had identified no
unconstitutional state action to which the statute could conceivably be a proportional response."l21 He reasoned similarly with
respect to the disability-access legislation in Lane.122 Going forward, Scalia resolved in Lane that he would confine Congress's
ability to "overenforce" the Fourteenth Amendment to legislation combating racial discrimination and would otherwise insist
that Congress's § 5 authority be limited to protecting against actual violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.123 Scalia's allowance
of prophylactic legislation for racial discrimination was based on
stare decisis, while the rest of his approach was based on his best
understanding of what "enforce" means as used in § 5.124
Although Scalia's approach in Lane is stricter than the
Court's approach in Boerne with respect to allowing legislation
that overenforces the Fourteenth Amendment, Scalia's approach
to § 5 has the potential to authorize § 5 legislation that Boerne
would not. That is because Boerne implicitly adopts judicial supremacy in determining what counts as a constitutional violation within Congress's power to remedy. In Boerne, for example,
"the Court equated its prior decision in Employment Division v.
Smith with the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause."125
But what if judicial supremacy is wrong? If judicial doctrine
underenforces the Fourteenth Amendment in some ways, for instance, then § 5 legislation that overenforces when measured
against that doctrine may nonetheless be within Congress's § 5
authority when measured against the doctrinally underenforced
Fourteenth Amendment itself. Although Scalia did not formulate his approach to § 5 with this possibility in view, his final

120 See Nevada Department of Human Resources v Hibbs, 538 US 721, 744 (2003)
(Kennedy dissenting).
121 Lane, 541 US at 557 (Scalia dissenting).
122 Id (Scalia dissenting).
123 Id at 558-65 (Scalia dissenting).
124 Id at 560 (Scalia dissenting) (noting that "[a] lot of water has gone under the
bridge" regarding the enforcement power).
125 Walsh, 58 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1747 (cited in note 1).
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description of his approach to § 5 is compatible with this insight.
In his concurrence in the judgment in Coleman v Maryland Court
of Appeals,126 Scalia summarily described his approach to § 5 as follows: "[O]utside of the context of racial discrimination (which is different for stare decisis reasons), I would limit Congress's § 5 power
to the regulation of conduct that itself violates the Fourteenth
Amendment."127
A combined commitment to constitutional originalism and
judicial departmentalism enables one to appreciate how pushing
aside the implicit judicial supremacy of Boerne could result in
the authorization of § 5 legislation that would not be authorized
under Boerne. Constitutional originalism provides a standard
outside of the Supreme Court's doctrine but inside the law that
enables one to see how legislation may appear to overenforce
when measured against judicial doctrine, but actually does not,
because the judicial doctrine underenforces the Fourteenth
Amendment as assessed from an originalist perspective.
For this claim to have practical bite, it remains only to be
seen whether there are any doctrines that underenforce the original law of the Fourteenth Amendment. From Scalia's point of
view, two obvious candidates to consider are the doctrines implementing the Second and Sixth Amendments, as incorporated
against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. There is good
reason to believe that Scalia viewed the Court's doctrine as underenforcing both. He said as much with respect to the Sixth
Amendment in his Bryant dissent and Clark concurrence in the
judgment.128 And in 2015, Scalia twice joined dissents from denial of certiorari by Justice Thomas that criticized the Court for
its "refusal to review a decision that flouts two of our Second
Amendment precedents."129
Suppose Congress were to try to do something about this
state of affairs through enactment of enforcement legislation under § 5. What if Congress were to enact legislation, for example,

126 566 US 30 (2012).
127 Id at 45 (Scalia concurring in the judgment).
128 See Bryant, 562 US at 380 (Scalia dissenting) ("[T]oday's opinion distorts our
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and leaves it in a shambles."); Clark, 135 S Ct at
2185 (Scalia concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the Court majority's "aggressive
hostility to precedent that it purports to be applying").
129 Friedman v City of Highland Park, 136 S Ct 447, 449 (2015) (Thomas dissenting
from denial of certiorari). See also Jackson v City and County of San Francisco, 135 S Ct
2799, 2799 (2015) (Thomas dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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that prohibits introduction in state criminal prosecutions of
statements that are nontestimonial under the Supreme Court's
current doctrine but testimonial under Scalia's understanding of
the original law of the Confrontation Clause? Or a federal law
preempting state-law bans on "assault weapons" to allow for athome possession for self-defense? Would these laws be within
Congress's authority under § 5?
From an originalist perspective, the answer depends not only
on whether the Sixth and Second Amendments themselves are
best understood as providing the legislated protections, but also
on whether the Fourteenth Amendment is best understood as
having incorporated these protections for enforcement against
the states. The relationship between original meaning and incorporation is crucial, for if the original law of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not provide for incorporation, then § 5 legislation
to enforce the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
would not include legislation enforcing the Bill of Rights.
In McDonald, Scalia joined the opinion for the Court holding
the Second Amendment incorporated against the states, but that
holding was based on the substantive due process analysis that
Scalia has acquiesced in because of stare decisis, rather than accepting it because he believes it correct. 30 Thomas argued in his
concurrence in the judgment in McDonald, though, that there is
good reason to believe as a matter of original law that "the right
to keep and bear arms is a privilege of American citizenship that
applies to States through the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges
or Immunities Clause.""' And, more generally, there is good reason to believe that "[a]t the very minimum, the original meaning
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause includes substantive
rights, in particular the rights listed in the first eight amendments to the Constitution."12 If that is right, then both the
Second Amendment's right to keep and bear arms and the Sixth

130 See McDonald, 561 US at 791 (Scalia concurring) (quotation marks and citation
omitted):

Despite my misgivings about substantive due process as an original matter, I
have acquiesced in the Court's incorporation of certain guarantees in the Bill of
Rights because it is both long established and narrowly limited. This case does
not require me to reconsider that view, since straightforward application of settled doctrine suffices to decide it.
131 Id at 806 (Thomas concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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Amendment's right to be confronted with the witnesses against
one were both incorporated against the states as a matter of the
original law of the Fourteenth Amendment.
We come to this: if judicial doctrine underenforces various
guarantees in the Bill of Rights, and if those guarantees are incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment-all from an
originalist point of view-then constitutional originalism can
combine with judicial departmentalism so that Congress can be
a partner in the pursuit of originalist law reform. In particular,
we have seen the potential for (1) originalist doctrines, like those
articulated in Crawford and Heller (2) to combine with the judicial departmentalist recognition that constitutional law applicable in the judicial department is not necessarily equivalent to,
and sometimes may underenforce, the law of the Constitution
(3) to authorize originalism-based reform legislation enacted by
Congress under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The practical
impact that could result if Congress were to enact legislation of
this sort would obviously depend significantly on the legislation
enacted. But doctrinally, such legislation could allow judges to
uphold a congressional act that rests on a correct interpretation
of the Constitution despite incorrect precedent suggesting a different interpretation. And more generally, alerting legislators
and the public to the availability of legislation of this sort reveals a lawful way to shake off constitutional lethargy and empower political actors to engage in a form of self-government
that the political actors have largely abdicated to the judiciary.
The discussion of the potential of § 5 for originalist law reform up to this point has focused on the way in which originalism can be used to identify areas appropriate for enforcement
legislation by supplying a standard to assess whether judicial
doctrine underenforces the underlying right. There is also another
important way that originalism can underwrite originalist law reform through § 5 legislation. That is by supplying a better understanding of the breadth of Congress's § 5 enforcement power
than set forth in Boerne.
I have previously contended, following Professor Michael
McConnell, that the Boerne Court's reasoning "rests on a false dichotomy" between a forbidden "substantive" authority of Congress
to define the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
132 Kurt T. Lash, The FourteenthAmendment and the Privileges and Immunities of
American Citizenship 283 (Cambridge 2014).
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permitted "remedial" authority to enact enforcement legislation
to address Fourteenth Amendment violations understood as
such according to judicial doctrine.'33 This dichotomy neglects
what McConnell calls an "interpretive" approach, under which
the question for the Court is not "whether Congress is enforcing
the Fourteenth Amendment as construed by the Court, but
whether it is enforcing a reasonable interpretation of the
FourteenthAmendment."134
McConnell has adduced evidence from the framing of the
Fourteenth Amendment that undercuts Boerne's exclusive reliance on judicially articulated doctrine and shows that "Congress
did not consider itself limited to enforcing judicially determined
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment."16 Suppose that
McConnell is correct that "Section Five was born of the conviction that Congress-no less than the courts-has the duty and
the authority to interpret the Constitution."136 This is but another
way of saying that constitutional originalism supports a broader
understanding of Congress's § 5 enforcement authority than
Boerne recognizes.

"Mission accomplished."137 These are (coincidentally?) the final words in Justice Scalia's final published Supreme Court
opinion. He could not have known when he wrote them at the
conclusion of his dissent in Montgomery that these would be the
last lines to flow from his judicial pen. But they are fitting. His
legacy for those who seek to carry on the intergenerational project of constitutional maintenance goes far beyond carrying out
the error-exposure mission of that final dissent. He accomplished
a far more important and long-lasting mission in the area of constitutional law. He changed how we understand our constitutional past. Extending well into the future, Scalia's intrepid
originalism will offer enduring insight into both what our law is
and also what it can be-even in the judicial department.

133 See Walsh, 58 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1748-49 (cited in note 1). In this article, I
discuss Michael W. McConnell, Comment, Institutions and Interpretation:A Critique of
City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 Harv L Rev 153, 170-74 (1997).
134 See McConnell, Comment, 111 Harv L Rev at 171 (cited in note 133).
135 Id at 175.
136 Id at 183.
137 Montgomery, 136 S Ct at 744 (Scalia dissenting).

